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In a well-known case of Capgras delusion, a patient asserts that his or her loved one has been replaced by 
an imposter, yet continues to eat, sleep, and live with the alleged imposter (e.g., Hirstein and 
Ramachandran, 1997). This is a striking case of “behavioral circumscription”: A subject’s assertion that p 
does not match her non-verbal behaviors. By contrast, what we will call “behavioral integration” occurs 
when a subject’s assertion that p matches her non-verbal behaviors. Many philosophers have maintained 
that lay people refrain from ascribing belief in cases of behavioral circumscription (e.g., Bayne, 2010; 
Bortolotti 2012; Bortolotti and Mameli 2012; Egan, 2009; Frankish 2012; Murphy 2012; Schwitzgebel 
2001, 2010, 2012; Tumulty 2012). The severe behavioral circumscription present in typical cases of 
Capgras delusion suggests that the delusional attitude “fail[s] to play the functional role that is essential to 
a state’s being a belief” (Bayne 2010, p. 330) and “the practice of belief ascription start[s] to break down” 
(Schwitzgebel, 2012, p. 16).   
Some have held that the relevant folk psychological attitude present in the Capgras-delusion and similar 
cases is imagination (e.g., Currie 2000; Currie and Jureidini 2001; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002).  Others 
have held that no familiar folk psychological attitude captures the relevant attitude displayed in these 
cases and that we need some gerrymandered attitude, such as “bimagination”, a mix of belief and 
imagination, to capture the relevant attitude (Egan, 2009).  Still others have held that while severe 
behavioral circumscription counts against classifying the attitude displayed in these cases as belief, the 
attitude is nonetheless belief-like, perhaps an instance of “anomalous” belief, “in-between belief,” or the 
like (e.g., Bortolotti, 2012; Reimer, 2010; Tumulty, 2012; Schwitzgebel, 2012).  But while many 
philosophers hold that behavioral integration is necessary for the folk ascription of belief—and so 
behavioral circumscription undermines belief ascription—they have not offered any empirical evidence in 
support of this claim. 
We doubt that behavioral circumscription undermines belief ascription in folk psychology.  Our doubt is 
encouraged by the results reported in Rose, Buckwalter, and Turri (2014) who found that the folk 
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overwhelmingly attribute belief in cases of Capgras delusion.  This suggests that non-linguistic behavior 
sometimes doesn’t count as evidence for or against the possession of a belief.  But why might non-
linguistic behavior fail to count as evidence for or against the possession of a belief?  Our view is that 
non-linguistic behavior sometimes doesn’t count as evidence for or against the possession of a belief 
because the type of evidence that is required for the ascription of belief is lexicographically ordered: 
Assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, non-linguistic 
behavioral evidence is disregarded. If an agent does not make any assertion or if it is not clear whether her 
assertion is sincere, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is taken into account.  And so in what follows, 
we’ll present evidence that across twenty-two countries and seventeen languages behavioral 
circumscription does not undermine belief ascription in folk psychology.  
 
1. Method and Participants  
We collected data from 5,788 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries.  Each 
subject was randomly assigned to one of two conditions.  They read one of two cases (we’ll call them 
“Consistent” and “Inconsistent”) based on Rose and colleagues (2014): 
Don and Katherine had been married for ten years. Like most married couples, they spent a lot of 
time together and did many things together. They regularly shared meals, went to the movies, 
lived in the same house, and slept in the same bed. Then one day, as Don was driving to the store, 
a car drove through a red light, hitting the driver side door of Don’s car. Don suffered a traumatic 
brain injury as the result of the gruesome traffic accident.  
 
In the year following his injury, Don began what appeared to be a remarkable and speedy 
recovery. He regained his powers of speech, and his intelligence, as well as nearly all his 
cognitive and social skills. However there was something very strange about Don after his 
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accident: he would tell his friends, family and doctors that his wife, Katherine, had been replaced 
by an imposter. 
Consistent: In addition, Don now always refused to eat meals with her, go to the movies with her, 
and sleep in the same bed with her. Katherine was very surprised and saddened by the things Don 
would say. 
Inconsistent: Surprisingly, however, Don continued to always eat meals with her, go to the 
movies with her, live in the same house as her, and sleep in the same bed with her. Katherine was 
very surprised and saddened by the things Don would say. 
After reading one of these two cases, participants answered a comprehension question, followed by a 
question about what Don believes about his wife: 
Comprehension: According to the story, which of the following statements is correct?  [Don tells 
his friends that his parents have been replaced by imposters/Don tells his friends that his wife has 
been replaced by an imposter.] 
 
Belief: Which option best reflects your personal opinion on the matter? [Don believes that 
Katherine is an imposter/Don does not believe that Katherine is an imposter.]   
 
The cases were translated into 17 languages and presented in the respective native language for each 
group (see Supplementary Mateerials).   
 
2. Results  
 
234 people answered Comprehension incorrectly.  Demographics for the remaining participants are in 
Table 1.  
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Table 1. Demographic information about the study’s participants who answered Comprehension 
correctly, including countries in which data were collected, nature of the sample (students vs. non-
students), and mode of survey administration (paper-pencil vs. web-based, volunteers vs. in exchange of a 
compensation, language of the survey). 
 
Country Students? Method Payment Language N 
      
Europe      
Bulgaria N Web-
based 
Volunteers Bulgarian 403 
France N Web-
based 
Compensation 
& volunteers 
French 429 
Germany N Web-
based 
Compensation German 209 
Italy Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Italian 198 
Lithuania N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Lithuanian 205 
Lithuania Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Lithuanian 146 
Portugal Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Portuguese 181 
Spain N Web-
based 
Compensation Spanish 271 
11 
 
Switzerland N Paper-
pencil & 
web-
based 
Volunteers French 50 
Switzerland Y Paper-
pencil & 
web-
based 
Compensation 
& volunteers 
French 26 
      
UK N Web-
based 
Compensation English 266 
      
Middle East      
Iran N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Persian 200 
Israel Y Web-
based 
Volunteers Hebrew 179 
Bedouin N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Arabic 50 
Lebanon Y Web-
based 
Volunteers English 164 
      
Central & 
North 
America 
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Mexico N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Spanish 181 
USA N Web-
based 
Compensation English 248 
      
South 
America 
     
Brazil Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Portuguese 160 
Colombia N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Spanish 135 
East Asia      
China Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers   Chinese,   
Simplified 
181 
China Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Chinese, 
Simplified 
164 
China N Web-
based 
Compensation Chinese, 
Simplified 
215 
Hong Kong Y Web-
based 
Compensation Chinese, 
Traditional 
192 
Japan N Web-
based 
Compensation Japanese 182 
Japan Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Japanese 206 
South Korea N Web- Compensation Korean 170 
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based 
Mongolia Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Mongolian 170 
      
South & 
Southeast 
Asia 
     
Indonesia Y Paper-
pencil 
Compensation Indonesian 189 
India Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Bengali 184 
      
 
 
 
Analyzing responses from the remaining 5,554 participants, we found a small effect of behavioral 
circumscription on belief ascription, χ2(1, 5554)=128.675, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.152, with the vast 
majority of individuals ascribing belief (91% in Consistent, 80% in Inconsistent) despite severe 
behavioral circumscription (see Figure 1).1   
 
 
                                                          
1 Throughout, for significant effects, we report effect sizes using Cramer’s V, which is a nonparametric correlation 
coefficient that indicates the strength of the relationship between nominal variables. This measure delivers a value 
between 0 and 1. We follow Ellis (2010) for interpreting the magnitude of the effect sizes. So for Cramer’s V we 
interpret values greater than or equal to .5 as large, greater than or equal to .3 but less than .5 as medium, and greater 
than or equal to .1 but less than .3 as small.  
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Figure 1: Overall Belief Ascription in the Consistent and Inconsistent Cases with 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
We then analyzed the effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription within each site.  The 
results are depicted in Figure 2 (see also Table 1 in Supplementary Materials).  
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Figure 2: Rates of Belief Ascription for Consistent and Inconsistent Cases for Each Site (*=p<.05, 
**=p<.01, ***=p<.001) 
In brief, we found that in all sites (except Iran and Guangzhou China) rates of belief ascription 
significantly exceeded chance (50%) even when non-linguistic behavior is at odds with a speaker’s 
assertion (Table 2).  
Table 2: Test of Belief Attribution Against Chance (50%) in Both Consistent and Inconsistent 
Cases for Each Site (*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001) 
Sample Consistent 
(χ2) 
(p-value) 
Inconsistent 
(χ2) 
(p-value) 
Central and 
North America 
  
Mexico 53.481 
*** 
56.627 
*** 
USA 
120.032 
*** 
90.613 
*** 
   
South America   
Colombia 59.853 
*** 
32.267 
*** 
Brazil 65.120 
*** 
28.800 
*** 
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Europe   
Bulgaria 115.200 
*** 
84.166 
*** 
France 105.140 
*** 
139.205 
*** 
Germany 59.259 
*** 
25.752 
*** 
Italy 91.162 
*** 
32.818 
*** 
Lithuania 91.124 
*** 
46.522 
*** 
Portugal 66.618 
*** 
31.696 
*** 
Spain 113.400 
*** 
87.397 
*** 
Switzerland 17.065 
*** 
24.200 
*** 
UK 120.273 
*** 
71.672 
*** 
   
Middle East   
Iran 16.000 
*** 
.160 
.689 
Bedouin 8.333 15.969 
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** *** 
Israel 58.778 
*** 
75.469 
*** 
Lebanon 54.084 
*** 
10.383 
** 
   
East Asia   
China 60.297 
*** 
17.695 
*** 
Hong Kong 62.082 
*** 
35.787 
*** 
Guangzhou China 74.075 
*** 
3.169 
.075 
Mainland China 75.872 
*** 
48.906 
*** 
Japan 140.247 
*** 
66.305 
*** 
South Korea 66.780 
*** 
22.000 
*** 
Mongolia 65.190 
*** 
10.465 
** 
   
South Asia   
Indonesia 48.269 
*** 
40.042 
*** 
18 
 
India 61.813 
*** 
34.935 
*** 
 
Participants sampled from Iran attributed belief less frequently in both the consistent and inconsistent 
cases.  While the majority attributed belief in the consistent case, people were divided in the inconsistent 
case.  A somewhat similar pattern occurred with participants sampled from Guangzhou China, though the 
majority in the inconsistent case attributed belief at rates that marginally exceeded chance (see Table 2).   
The key point, however, for present purposes is this: their practice of belief attribution is not “breaking 
down” in the way we would expect if behavioral integration were a necessary feature of belief.  They may 
be somewhat ambivalent, but they are clearly not denying belief in the way we would expect if behavioral 
integration was necessary for belief ascription in folk psychology.   
3. Discussion 
We have found that in many countries, across many languages, once a speaker has sincerely asserted that 
p, people do not refrain from ascribing belief when non-linguistic behavior is at odds with the possession 
of a belief that p: in fact, once a speaker sincerely asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence seems 
to be largely disregarded.2 Our results dramatically extend the findings from Rose and colleagues (2014) 
for USA participants. 
Of course our results do not mean that non-linguistic behavior never counts as evidence for or against the 
possession of a belief. When an agent does not assert anything, her behavior is often telling. What the 
data suggests is that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, 
lexicographically ordered: sincere assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely 
asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. If an agent does not make any assertion, 
                                                          
2 We informally polled 25 English speaking informants and all of them said it was likely that the speaker in our 
Capgras cases was sincere. We also asked some research partners who conducted the research in other languages 
whether they thought speakers of that language would regard the statement by Don in the Capgras cases as sincere.  
They said it was likely that speakers of these respective languages think that the speaker in our Capgras cases was 
sincere.  
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non-linguistic behavioral evidence is then taken into account. (Various types of non-linguistic behavioral 
evidence may also be lexicographically ordered, but our data does not speak to that question.)  
We also find that rates of belief ascription are high across virtually every site despite severe behavioral 
circumscription.  This is not at all what we would expect if behavioral integration was necessary for belief 
ascription in the folk psychology of belief.  Sincere assertions and non-linguistic behavior seem lexically 
ordered in the twenty-two sites we collected data from. Some of our data come from students, others from 
non-student populations. While most data sets come from industrialized societies, two data sets come 
from traditional societies: the Bedouin in Israel and the Nasa People of Colombia.  
The upshot is that we may have discovered a universal principle of folk psychology that psychologists 
and philosophers of cognitive science working on mindreading have so far ignored: behavioral evidence 
and sincere assertions are lexicographically ordered. Naturally, further cross-cultural and cross-linguistic 
research is needed to further support this claim, but the scope of our enquiry provides strong support for 
our hypothesis about universality.  
We did find that behavioral circumscription produced an effect in 16 of the 26 (61.5%) sites examined 
(see Figure 2 and Supplementary Materials), but this effect is typically small: Of those 16 sites, 14 
(87.5%) displayed a small effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription (see Figures 3 and 4).  
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Figure 3: Difference in Rates of Belief Attribution Between Consistent and Inconsistent Cases  
 
21 
 
Figure 4: Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Behavioral Circumscription on Belief Attribution for 
Each Site3 
Participants sampled from Mongolia and from Guangzhou in China displayed a moderate effect of 
behavioral circumscription on belief ascription (a 27% difference in Mongolia; a 34% difference in 
Guangzhou), but the majority of participants in Mongolia attributed belief despite severe behavioral 
circumscription (see Table 2). Moreover, those in Guangzhou China attributed belief at rates that 
marginally exceeded chance in the inconsistent case (see Table 2).  That said, it may be that a minority of 
varying size, depending perhaps on culture and language (see Figures 3 and 4), does not lexicographically 
order sincere assertion and non-linguistic behavior to ascribe beliefs.  
To conclude, taken together, our results suggest that behavioral integration is not a necessary feature of 
belief in folk psychology: People tend to ascribe beliefs when non-linguistic behavior is at odds or in line 
with sincere assertions, though the rate does vary depending on the culture and language.  
4. Objections and Responses 
4.1 BELIEF is not a Universal Concept 
Proponents of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) have argued that in contrast to KNOW, BELIEF is 
not a universal concept, a “semantic prime” in their terminology (e.g., Wierzbicka, 2006, Ch. 7).4 It can’t 
thus be that we have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk 
psychology.  
The NSM claim that many languages lack a term for “belief” raises deep questions about synonymy and  
translation.  If the NSM claim were true, then many of our translations would be defective.  We are 
inclined to think that the NSM view on what is required for synonymy and translation is far too stringent.  
But this is not the place to defend that view.  Instead, we can simply make clear that our claim is about 
                                                          
3 See fn. 1 on benchmarks for interpreting Cramer’s V. 
4 We use small caps to denote concepts. 
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standard translations, the sorts that are provided by dictionaries and expert translators.  We maintain that 
behavioral integration is not necessary for belief attribution in English, nor is it necessary for the 
attribution of the standard translation of “belief” in a wide range of languages from quite different 
language groups.  This is impressive evidence that the phenomenon is universal, though since there are 
about 6000 extant languages, it is entirely possible that behavioral integration is necessary for the 
standard translation of “belief” in one or more of those languages.   
Finally, we would add that even if the NSM claim is right, it is still the case that that we have discovered 
a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology where BELIEF is acquired. 
4.2 Limitations of the Vignette 
One could object that our failure to find behavioral circumscription preventing belief ascription is simply 
due to the shortcomings of our vignette.  
We concede that this is a possibility. However, to be in a position to take this objection seriously, we 
would need to know how exactly the vignette we used prevents the influence of behavioral 
circumscription on belief ascription to manifest itself. Furthermore, this vignette is based on cases 
extensively discussed in the philosophical literature on belief, namely, typical cases of Capgras delusion.   
4.3 Sincerity 
One could challenge our conclusion that behavioral circumscription does not prevent belief ascription by 
insisting that when we decide whether someone makes a sincere assertion and thus believe what she 
seems to say, we do pay attention to how this person behaves. How could it be, then, that when behavior 
and speech conflict we simply overlook behavior? 
We sometimes do pay attention to behavior to assess sincerity, but, first, we often do not need to appeal to 
non-linguistic behavioral evidence to decide whether an assertion is sincere: For instance, we may be told 
23 
 
that a speaker sincerely asserted that p or the conversational context may imply that her assertion was 
sincere.  
Second, the issue of interest among philosophers debating about belief ascription and the nature of belief 
is not whether we overlook behavior when it conflicts with speech in general. Rather, the issue of interest 
is whether people who sincerely assert that p believe that p even when their non-linguistic behavior is at 
odds with believing that p.  And in these cases, such as cases of Capgras delusion, the evidence does 
suggest that in folk psychology the kind of evidence required for the ascription of belief is 
lexicographically ordered.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Many philosophers hold that behavioral integration plays a necessary role in the folk psychology of 
belief.  Our results suggest that this view is badly mistaken. Despite being confronted with a case 
involving severe behavioral circumscription—the case of Capgras delusion—people across a wide range 
of cultures and languages overwhelmingly attribute belief (in all but, at most, two sites examined out of 
26 sites in 22 countries), and nowhere did we find a dramatic effect of behavioral circumscription on 
belief ascription. One key lesson then from these cross-cultural results is that it seems to be a cross-
cultural folk-psychological universal that behavioral integration is not required for belief ascription.   
What explains our results? We propose that sincere assertions and non-linguistic behavior are 
lexicographically ordered: When a speaker sincerely asserts that p, we tend to ascribe to her the belief that 
p whether or not her non-linguistic behavior reflects that belief. Our cross-cultural and cross-linguistic 
findings suggest that this principle governing belief ascription may well be a universal, although we also 
find some variation across sites in the size of the minority of people taking behavioral circumscription 
into account while ascribing belief. Future research could examine whether this principle governing belief 
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ascription is robust, extending to other kinds of delusion cases (e.g., Cotard delusion, paranoid 
schizophrenia, etc.) and non-delusional cases (e.g., religious belief, implicit racism).5 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Table 1: Effect of Behavioral Circumscription on Belief Ascription for Each Site (*=p<.05, 
**=p<.01, ***=p<.001) 
Sample N χ2 p-value Cramer’s V 
Central and 
North America 
    
Mexico 181 .683 .408 .061 
USA 248 6.669 * .164 
     
South America     
Colombia 135 2.634 .105 .140 
Brazil 160 6.632 
* 
.204 
     
Europe     
Bulgaria 403 6.681 
* 
.129 
France 429 2.664 .103 .079 
Germany 209 4.779 
* 
.151 
Italy 198 17.795 *** .299 
Lithuania 351 5.697 
* 
.127 
Portugal 181 7.353 
** 
.202 
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Spain 271 1.797 .180 .081 
Switzerland 76 .003 .957 .006 
UK 266 11.390 
** 
.207 
     
Middle East     
Iran 200 10.004 
** 
.224 
Bedouin 50 1.691 .193 .184 
Israel 179 .117 .732 .026 
Lebanon 164 12.584 *** .277 
     
East Asia     
China 181 12.170 
*** 
.259 
Hong Kong 192 3.082 .079 .127 
Guangzhou China 164 29.060 *** .421 
Mainland China 215 3.060 .080 .119 
Japan 388 20.693 *** .231 
South Korea 170 13.266 
*** 
.279 
Mongolia 170 19.228 
*** 
.336 
     
South Asia     
Indonesia 189 .492 .483 .051 
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India 184 4.230 
* 
.152 
 
 
Translations 
1. Arabic 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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2. Bulgarian 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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3. Chinese Traditional 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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4. Chinese Simplified 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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5. French 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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6. German 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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7. Hebrew 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
8. Indonesian 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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9. Italian 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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10. Japanese 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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11. Korean 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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12. Lithuanian 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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13. Mongolian 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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14. Persian 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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15. Portuguese 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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16. Spanish 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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17. Bengali 
A. Consistent 
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B. Inconsistent 
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